An Inquiry into the Retail Petrol Market in Singapore

This inquiry examines whether the retail petrol market in Singapore is competitive. In particular, it examines whether the petrol companies’ retail petrol prices are the same and move in tandem (“price parallelism”), whether prices increase more or faster than they decrease (“rocket and feather” effect), and whether there is evidence of collusion between the players.

Although the market structure and conditions of retail petrol in Singapore suggest a material risk of collusive or coordinated practices between the market players, based on current facts and data, there is no evidence that the petrol players are engaged in anti-competitive collusive behaviour.

CCS continues to monitor developments in this sector.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Competition Commission of Singapore or the Government of Singapore.

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